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HUMAN RIGHTS COMMENT
THE TORTURE VICTIM PROTECTION
ACT: A VITAL CONTRIBUTION TO
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT OR JUST A
NICE GESTURE?
It has become obvious that technological idiocy, unbridled fanati-
cism and Realpolitik have pushed humanity, for the first time in
its history, to the brink of a precipice where the mode and condi-
tions of life are at risk. This danger may be averted only by pay-
ing unconditional respect to human dignity.1
INTRODUCTION
Human rights refers to those rights human beings have
simply because they are human beings and not because they are
members of any particular nation.2 Almost every nation is will-
ing to agree, as an abstract principle, that the rights of human
beings are entitled to some level of respect and protection.3
1 Supreme Court of Argentina, Buenos Aires, Judgment of 22 June 1987.
(Causa No. 547 incoada en virtud del Decreto No. 280/84 del Poder Ejecutivo Na.
tional)(Justice Jorge Antonio Bacque, dissenting). The full opinion is published in
English in Supreme Court of Argentina, Buenos Aires, 8 HUM. RTS. L. J., 430-71
(1987).
2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF HuMAN RiGHTs 1 & 3 (Rhoda E. Howard &
Jack Donnelly eds., 1987) [hereinafter HANDBooK]. There is no single authorita-
tive definition of 'human rights.' The RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES (RmvsED) § 701 CMT. A (Tent. Final Draft 1986) (here-
inafter RESTATEMENT] defines human rights as:
[F]reedoms, immunities, and benefits which, by widely accepted contempo-
rary values, every human being should enjoy in the society in which the
individual lives or to whose... jurisdiction he or she lives. By international
law and agreement states have recognized many specific human rights and
assumed obligations to respect them.
3 HowARD & DoNmELLY, supra note 2, at 2-4.
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However, there exists sharp differences in world opinion as to
which rights are guaranteed, as well as to whom and under
what circumstances they are guaranteed. These differences
have fostered a global environment which lacks effective mech-
anisms for human rights enforcement. 4 Hence, while many
abuses are so-called "universally-condemned," they remain
widely condoned in practice.5 Victims of human rights abuses
often find themselves without remedy because their own gov-
ernments refuse to provide one and because most international
tribunals will not entertain the claims of individuals. 6 Resort to
the United Nations has also proven to be largely ineffective. 7
The only available legal option for many individuals is the court
of another nation, particularly the United States.
The United States judiciary has, in some instances, pro-
vided a legal forum for human rights victims through the Alien
Tort Claims Act.8 The ATCA gives the district court jurisdic-
tion to hear civil actions brought by aliens for torts commited
"in violation of the law of nations."9 However, courts tend to
view the ATCA as an "old but little used section... no one seems
to know whence it came."10
In response to the concerns prompted by a narrow construc-
tion of the ATCA, Congress has adopted the Torture Victim Pro-
tection Act of 199111 in order to alleviate some of the
jurisdictional difficulties faced by foreign human rights victims.
The TVPA is remarkable for the fact that, unlike the ATCA, it
provides alien victims of official torture (and extrajudicial kill-
4 HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIE WORLD COMMUNITY IssUEs Am ACTION 27 (Richard
Pierre Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 3d. ed. 1991).
5 Id.
6 Article 34 of the Statute of The International Court of Justice, declares: "1.
Only states may be parties in cases before the Court." See Statute of International
Court of Justice, art. 34, 59 Stat 10-55, T.S. No. 993 (1945).
7 CLAUDE & WEsTON, supra note 4, at 22.
8 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982) [hereinafter ATCA].
9 Id.
10 HT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
11 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) [hereinafter TVPA] was introduced into the House of Representatives on
March 4, 1987 and the Senate on March 24, 1987. The chief co-sponsors of the act
were Congressmen Gus Yatron (D-Pennsylvania), Jim Leach (R-Iowa), and Peter
Rodino (D-New Jersey); the lead Senate co-sponsors were Senators Arlen Specter
(R-Pennsylvania) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont). The legislation was passed by
the Senate on March 3, 1992 and signed by President Bush March 12.
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ing) with a private right of action in American courts.' 2
Whether the act will be successful in adjudicating the claims of
human rights victims depends very much on the alleviation of
its doctrinal and practical limitations. Indeed, until a case is
brought under its substantive provisions, its real impact re-
mains speculative. However, there is much support for the
proposition that despite its limitations, the TVPA greatly ad-
vances America's role as an international human rights
protector.13
This comment examines the provisions of the TVPA and its
implications for adjudicating human rights violations in U.S.
courts. Part I offers a brief history of international human
rights law. Part H examines the provisions of the ATCA and
the judicial conflict over its proper construction and over the
role of customary international law in US courts. Part I ex-
amines the provisions of the TVPA and offers a comparison to
those of the ATCA. Part IV discusses the positive and negative
aspects of the TVPA's impact on human rights litigation in
America. Part V concludes that the TVPA's enactment is both
necessary and desirable.
I. HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs
The traditional view of international law, heavily laden
with concepts of sovereignty, focused on states rather than indi-
viduals. 14 As a result, a state's treatment of its own citizens
was purely a matter of state concern.' 5 The governments of
Iran, Paraguay, Romania, Uganda and others have ritually
called upon state sovereignty to defend their unwillingness to
guarantee basic human rights to their citizens. 16 Thus, the
state sovereignty doctrine has traditionally been a major obsta-
cle to international human rights enforcement. 17
12Id.
13 The Torture Victim Protection Act: Hearing and Markup on H.R. 1417
Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Human Rights
and International Organizations of the House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 2nd
Sess. 86, 88 n.1 (1988) (statement of Congressman Gus Yatron, chairman of the
subcommittee) [hereinafter Hearing].
14 P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RiGuTs 11-12 (1983).
16 Id. at 11.
16 CLAuDE & WESTON, supra note 4, at 3.
17 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4, at 3.
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Human rights did not become an important international
concern until World War II, with the rise and fall of Nazi Ger-
many and world outrage over its atrocities.18 An earlier rever-
ence for the state sovereignty doctrine that "discouraged outside
efforts to intervene on behalf of populations victimized by even
the most cruel and tyrannical of rulers"19 was replaced with the
view that sovereignty must yield to human rights limitations.
With the close of World War H and the landmark Nuremberg
trials,20 'individuals' became legitimate subjects of global con-
cern and the modern view of international human rights was
born.
Since its formation in 1945, the United Nations has played
a pivotal role in defining and enumerating basic human rights.
The U.N. Charter begins by reaffirming a "faith in fundamental
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
[and] in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small."21 The Charter states as one of its purposes: "to
achieve international cooperation... in promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights.... 22 The Charter, as a treaty,
is binding upon Member States.23
However, the vague and general terms of the Charter's
human rights clauses have given rise to disagreement over the
18 J. HUmPHREY, HUmAN RiGHmS AND THE UNrrED NATIONS 10-13 (1984).
19 MARviN S. SoRoos, BEYOND SovEREiGwm 230 (1987). Classical interna-
tional law also recognized humanitarian intervention as an exception to a state's
sovereignty regarding its conduct toward its own nationals. The doctrine was in-
voked to justify intervention when a state's treatment of its own citizens horrified
the international community. I. BROWNIus, TERNAToNAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES 340-42 (1960).
20 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4, at 46-47. In 1945, Nazi leaders captured
as criminals of war were convicted not only for violations of war customs but for
"crimes against humanity." These included persecution of civilians for political,
racial or religious reasons. These convictions were justified whether or not they
were committed in accordance with the domestic law of the country where perpetu-
ated. The law of Germany, however authoritative, constituted no defense to the
charges. Thus, Nuremberg represents a recognition that individuals, as much as
states, are to be responsible members of the international community. CLAUDE &
WESTON, supra note 4, at 46-47.
21 U.N. CHARTER Preamble.
22Id.
23 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 2 states: "All members, in order to ensure to all
of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good
faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."
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extent of obligations the Charter imposes.24 Some authorities
have argued that states, in becoming parties to the U.N. Char-
ter, accept no more than minimal obligations toward human
rights.25 These governments look not only to the vague terms of
the human rights clauses but to Article 2(7) which states that
nothing in the Charter "shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state."26
Other nations insist that the Charter's human rights provi-
sions, as part of a legally binding treaty, invoke a pledge of posi-
tive action on behalf of every Member State.27 These states rely
upon the enumeration of specific human rights in subsequent
instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.28 The Universal Declaration is proof that human
rights, having been elevated to the level of international con-
cern, are no longer matters essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of each state and therefore, are outside the scope of
Article 2(7).29
The aforementioned Universal Declaration is an enumera-
tion of 'human rights' referred to in the U.N. Charter.30
Although it has no legal binding effect, 31 it is generally recog-
nized by both domestic and international tribunals as defining
standards of international human rights. There is ample sup-
port for the view that reliance on its provisions in a number of
states elevates the Universal Declaration to the status of cus-
24 CLAUDE & WESON, supra note 4, at 21.
25 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4, at 21.
26 U.N. CHARR art. 2, para. 7.
27 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4, at 21.
28 GA. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The preamble of the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights [hereinafter Universal Declaration] states:
The General Assembly [p]roclaims this... Declaration... as a common stan-
dard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every
individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in
mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these
rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and interna-
tional, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance,
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peo-
ples of territories under their jurisdiction.
29 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4, at 21.
30 Supra note 28 and accompanying text.
31 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4, at 22-23.
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tomary international law3 2 and is, as such, binding upon all
nations.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Charter and Univer-
sal Declaration, disagreement over the extent of obligations im-
posed by these instruments has created a global environment
which provides minimal recourse to victims of human rights vi-
olations. 33 This is evidenced by the fact that although many
states have signed onto the Charter, Universal Declaration, Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms34 and other international agreements, 35
32 The definition of customary international law comprises two distinct ele-
ments: (1) general practice; and (2) its acceptance as law. Louts HENmN, RicHARU
CRAwFoRD PUGH, OSCAR SCHACHTER & HANS SMrr, INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES
AND MATEmrALs 37 (2d. ed. 1987) [hereinafter HENKIn]. According to the RESTATE-
mENT, supra note 2, reporter's note 1 & 2:
There is some readiness to find that the practice of states, perhaps under
constitutional, political or moral impetus, is practiced with a sense of inter-
national legal obligation creating a customary international law of human
rights, even though many states sometimes violate these rights.... Prac-
tice accepted as building customary human rights law includes: virtual uni-
versal adherence to the U.N. Charter and its human rights provisions, and
virtually universal and frequently reiterated acceptance of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights even if only in principle; virtually universal
participation of states in the preparation and adoption of international
agreements recognizing human rights principles...; the adoption of human
rights principles by states in regional organizations.. .; general support by
states for U.N. Resolutions.. .; action by states to conform their national law
or practice to standards or principles declared by international bodies, and
the incorporation of human rights provisions.., in national constitutions or
laws; [and] invocation of human rights principles in national policy, in diplo-
matic practice... and other adverse state reactions to violations by other
states.
33 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4.
34 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
s Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague
Hijacking Convention), December 16, 1970, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; Convention on the
High Seas (Geneva Convention on the Law of the Seas), April 29, 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 11; Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, September 7, 1956, 266
U.N.T.S. 3; ILO Convention (No. 105, 25 Jun 1957) Concerning the Abolition of
Forced Labour, 320 U.N.T.S. 291; Convention (with Final Protocol), Suppression of
the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, March
21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271; Geneva Convention (with Final Act and Resolutions of
the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva). Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention (with Annexes. Protection of Civilians in Time of War, August
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more than one-third of the world's governments have tolerated
torture and other abuses in our times.3 6
Moreover, the failure of individual governments to ade-
quately enforce human rights does not normally provoke U.N.
action.37 "[T]he UN organs responsible for the promotion of
human rights suffer from most of the same disabilities that af-
ffict the United Nations as a whole, in particular the absence of
a supranational authority and the presence of divisive power
politics." 38 Therefore, U.N. action in defense of human rights is
not normally expected to be swift or effective.
The absence of an international criminal court39 and the in-
ability of victims to be remedied by their own courts or the
United Nations has left these individuals, all too often, with the
question 'where do we go from here?' The answer may very well
be found in a United States district court.
H1. ALIEN TORT CLmms ACT
A. Provisions of the ATCA
The Alien Tort Claims Act was enacted by the First Con-
gress in section nine of the Judiciary Act of 1789.40 The statute
provides: "[tihe district court shall have original jurisdiction of a
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."41 The lan-
guage of the statute is noticeably vague, providing little gui-
dance as to what behavior constitutes a "violation of the law of
nations."42 Legislative history is also very limited. There is
simply no direct evidence of congressional intent.43
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Convention. Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
36 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4.
37 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4, at 3.
38 CLAUDE & WESTON, supra note 4, at 22.
39 See Joel Cavicchia, The Prospects for an International Criminal Court in
the 1990s, 10 DicK. J. INL L. 223 (1992).
40 Act of September 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
41 ATCA, supra note 8.
42 ATCA, supra note 8.
43 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774,812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring), (where Judge Bork noted that the Senate debates on the Judiciary
Act of 1789 were not recorded and the House debates did not mention the ATCA),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
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It is an established principle that the law of nations has
been incorporated into United States federal common law. This
principle was first articulated in the Supreme Court case, the
Paquete Habana,44 which contains Justice Gray's famous com-
ment: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate
jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination."45
Two issues then become critical: (1) whether a particular
right has achieved the status of customary international law so
that its breach violates the law ofnations, 46 and (2) whether the
law of nations requirement of the ATCA should be construed as
it was understood in 1789 or as it has evolved, reflecting
changes in custom over the past two centuries.47 Disagreement
over these issues has produced two distinct and contrasting ju-
dicial interpretations: Judge Kaufman's broad view of the law of
nations requirement articulated in the landmark human rights
case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala4 and the narrow, restrictive view
proposed by Judge Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.49
B. The Filartiga Opinion
Dr. Filartiga and his daughter, both Paraguayan citizens,
brought a wrongful death action in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York against Pena-Irala,
also a citizen of Paraguay.50 The Filartigas alleged that the de-
fendant, in his capacity as Inspector-General of the police in
44 175 U.S. 677 (1900). In the Paquete Habana, the Cuban owners of fishing
vessels seized by United States officials during the Spanish-American War argued
that customary international law exempted coastal fishermen from capture as
prizes of war. The court, in agreeing with the fishermen, held, where there are no
treaties or controlling executive or legislative acts, as in the present case, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations. At this time it was an
established rule of international law, recognized by the United States, France,
Britain, Holland, Japan and many others, that unarmed coastal fishing vessels
were exempt from capture as prizes of war. Thus, the United States was in viola-
tion of customary international law and, as such, must honor the release of the
fishermen and their vessels. Id. at 700.
45 Id. at 700.
46 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
47 Id. at 877-888
48 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
49 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799.
50 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
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Paraguay, tortured Dr. Filartiga's seventeen year-old son to
death in retaliation for the doctor's political activities.51 Juris-
diction was claimed under the ATCA.52 The district court dis-
missed the case, however, construing the ATCA narrowly so as
to exclude a state's treatment of its own citizens from review.
5 3
The Second Circuit, following the Paquete Habana line of
reasoning54, reversed and held: "deliberate torture perpetuated
under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of
the nationality of the parties. Thus, whenever an alleged tor-
turer is found and served with process within our borders, the
ATCA provides jurisdiction."55 Judge Kaufman referred to the
reliance of many states on the provisions of the U.N. Charter
and the Universal Declaration as evidence that the prohibition
of torture had reached the status of customary international
law. 56 He also found that torture is prohibited, either expressly
or implicitly, by the constitutions of over fifty-five nations, in-
cluding Paraguay.57 Thus, the court concluded, freedom from
torture is a universally-recognized right and is, as such, part of
the law of nations.58
The Filartiga opinion is important for several reasons: (1) it
gives individuals a private right of action to enforce human
rights under the ATCA,59 (2) it recognizes torture as universally
condemned and hence, a violation of the law of nations,60 and
(3) it proffers a broad construction of the ATCA so as to include
contemporary universally-recognized rights and those which
will ripen into custom at some point in the future.61
Filartiga inspired hope that the ATCA would be an effec-
tive tool for bringing human rights violators to justice in Ameri-
51 Id.
52 Id. at 880.
53 Id.
64 Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
55 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
56 Id. at 881-884.
57 Id. at 884.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 878.
60 Id at 881-884.
61 Id. at 885.
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can courts.6 2 However, this hope would soon be diminished in
the aftermath of the D.C. Circuit's decision in Tel-Oren v. Lib-
yan Arab Republic.63
C. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic
In Tel-Oren, representatives of twenty-nine persons who
died in a terrorist attack in Israel filed an ATCA claim in the
District Court for the District of Columbia against Libya, the
Palestinian Liberation Organization and others allegedly re-
sponsible.64 The district court dismissed the case, refusing to
extend jurisdiction under the ATCA.65
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal in three concurring
opinions, the most notable written by Judge Bork.6 6 Judge
Bork flatly rejected the Paquete Habana and Filartiga approach
to interpreting the law of nations requirement of the ATCA:
It is one thing for a case like the Paquete Habana to find that a
rule has evolved so that the United States may not seize coastal
fishing boats of a nation at which we are at war. It is another
thing entirely, a difference in degree so enormous as to be a differ-
ence in kind, to find that a rule has evolved against torture so that
our courts may sit in judgment of the conduct of foreign officials in
their own countries with respect to their own citizens. The latter
raises prospects of judicial interference with foreign affairs that
the former does not.67
Judge Bork believed the framers of the ATCA could not have
intended to infringe upon the sovereignty of other countries so
that the law of nations requirement of the ATCA must be nar-
rowly construed to include only those human rights considered
universally binding in 1789.68
Furthermore, even if the court had concluded that the law
of nations incorporated all the modern rules of international
law the case would still be dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction. Ac-
62 Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights
Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 53 (1981).
63 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812.
64 Id. at 776.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 798-816 (Bork, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 813.
68 Id. at 816.
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cording to Judge Bork, "[llt is essential that there be an explicit
grant of a cause of action before a private plaintiff be allowed to
enforce principles of international law in a federal tribunal."6 9
He went on to argue:
Neither the law of nations nor any of the relevant treaties pro-
vides a cause of action appellants may assert in courts of the
United States.... We should not, in an area such as this, infer a
cause of action not explicitly given. In reaching this conclusion, I
am guided chiefly by separation of powers principles, which cau-
tion courts to avoid interference with the political branches' con-
duct of foreign relations.70
Thus, the ATCA essentially a jurisdictional statute could not
provide the plaintiffs with a private right of action in the ab-
sence of a congressional mandate. 71
D. Congressional Action Becomes Necessary
According to the decision in Tel-Oren, ATCA actions may
implicate matters of foreign relations, meaning matters which
are exclusively within the constitutional domain of the legisla-
tive and executive branches of government.72 It is no small
wonder that the judiciary has normally been reluctant to hear
ATCA claims.7 3 As Judge Bork noted, "[a] statute whose origi-
nal meaning is hidden from us and yet, which, if its words are
read inconsistently with modern assumptions in mind, is capa-
ble of plunging our nation into foreign conflicts, ought to be ap-
proached by the judiciary with great circumspection."7 4
As a result of the conflict over the ATCA's proper construc-
tion, Congressional action became necessary to clarify how
courts could acquire jurisdiction under the ATCA without in-
69 I& at 801.
70 Id. at 799.
71 In Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341
U.S. 246, 249 (1952) (cited in Judge Bork's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren), the
Supreme Court held: The Judicial Code, in vesting jurisdiction in the District
Courts, does not create causes of action, but only confers jurisdiction to adjudicate
those arising from other sources which satisfy its limiting provisions."
72 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799.
73 The ATCA has been invoked successfully on only four occasions in the past
two centuries: Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Adra v. Cli, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md.
1961); Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795).
74 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812.
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fringing upon US foreign policy.75 In order for the mandate of
the Paquete Habana ("international law is part of our law")76 to
have any significant effect, the Filartiga approach to adjudicat-
ing human rights law must be given a congressional stamp of
approval. The TVPA accomplishes this very principle.77
I. Tiim TORTURE VicTrm PROTECTION ACT
A. Purpose
The TVPA of 1991 is intended to ensure that alien victims
of official torture do not encounter Tel-Oren type obstacles when
bringing suit in a U.S. court.78 The act mandates that courts
apply the provisions of the U.N. Charter and other interna-
tional human rights agreements in deciding the merits of a
TVPA action.79 In doing so, Congress upholds the view that the
U.N. Charter as a treaty and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights as customary international law are binding
upon the United States.8 0 Thus, the need to ascertain whether
certain treaty provisions or customs are incorporated into U.S.
law is removed from the judiciary. The TVPA itself ensures
that freedom from torture is a universally recognized right di-
rectly enforceable against individuals in American courts.8 '
Views articulated during the TVPA hearings make it clear
that Judge Bork's reservations regarding the proper construc-
tion of the ATCA provided the impetus for the TVPA's enact-
ment.82 By expressly providing two causes of action, torture
76 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799.
76 Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
77 TVPA, supra note 11; Hearing, supra note 13.
78 The TVPA amends the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C.
§§ 287-287e (1982).
79 TVPA, supra note 11, Statement of Purpose.80 U.N. CHARTER, supra note 23.
81 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(a)(1).
82 According to Alice Henkin, Chair, Committee on International Human
Rights, Association of the Bar of the City of New York: Hearing, supra note 13, at
1.
..the earlier statute [ATCAI does not speak specifically about torture and
extrajudicial killing. It speaks about a tort committed in violation of the law
of nations. It is hard to know exactly what the legislators had in mind in
1789 when referring to a tort committed in violation of the law of nations
and the problems that result from interpreting that language, have caused
some of the confusion.... This act gets at those specific acts of torture and
208 [Vol. 6:197
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and extrajudicial killing,83 the TVPA satisfies Judge Borks pri-
mary objection to using the ATCA; that a cause of action could
not be found in or inferred from the ATCA without infringing
upon the domain of the political branches.84
When asked about the primary purpose of the TVPA,
Michael Posner of the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights
responded:
This is really an effort to clarify, to make sure that every federal
court in the United States understands explicitly that the acts of
torture and extrajudicial killing can be remed[ied] in the United
States, that there is a private right of action. And that, the U.S.
Congress... has gone on record... in support of this kind ofjudi-
cial relief.85
In essence, the TVPA gives congressional endorsement to the
Filartiga approach of exercising jurisdiction to provide a rem-
edy to foreign victims of torture.86
While the TVPA is intended to reinforce and clarify the role
of human rights law in American courts, it is not intended to
supplant the ATCA. According to Alice Henkin, Chair of the
Committee on International Human Rights:
The reason for preserving section 1350, even in the presence of
this new legislation is for the future and any emerging consensus
on what is a violation of the law of nations. For example, the pos-
sibility that forced disappearances [may] at some point have the
same level of universal condemnation.... So, I do not think they
[TVPA and ATCAI are exclusive of each other.., there is need to
preserve [both] .... 87
The statements of Alice Henkin and otherss s clearly ex-
press that preservation of the ATCA is necessary and desirable.
extrajudicial killing which are now universally recognized as violations of
the law of nations.
83 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2.
84 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799.
8s Hearing, supra note 13, at 71, statement of Michael H. Posner, Executive
Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
86 Hearing, supra note 13 at 71.
87 Hearing, supra note 13, at 71, statement of Alice Henkin.
88 Hearing, supra note 13, at 2-28.u[C]laims based on torture or summary ex-
ecutions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered by
section 1350. That statute should remain intact to permit suits based on other
norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary inter-
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Given the congressional intent of the TVPA, 9 an argument can
be made that the TVPA does more than merely 'preserve' the
ATCA. Indeed, the TVPA may breathe new life into the rarely-
used ATCA. This point will be discussed fully in Section IV.
B. Congress' Ability to Enact the TVPA
Congress' power to grant our federal courts jurisdiction to
hear TVPA claims is supported by both the U.S. Constitution
and international law. Article III of the Constitution gives the
federal judiciary the power to hear cases 'arising under' the
'laws of the United States.'9 0 The Supreme Court has held that
US federal common law incorporates international law9l
thereby allowing Congress to confer jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing foreign plaintiffs and defendants. 92
In addition to Article III, Article I, section 8 authorizes
Congress "to define and punish... Offenses against the Law of
Nations."93 The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as
granting Congress the power to make laws which incorporate
those international rules that are intended to govern
individuals.94
Moreover, international law itself provides each state with
the discretion to remedy violations of international law in their
own courts if they so choose. 95 According to the doctrine of uni-
versal jurisdiction, set forth by section 404 of the Restatement
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States a "state may
exercise jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recog-
nized by the community of nations as of universal con-
cern .. ."96 Torture is clearly such an offense.
national law." Hearing, supra note 13, at 36-37, (prepared statement of the Associ-
ation of the N.Y.C. Bar).
89 See Hearing, supra note 13, at 71.
90 Article II, section II of the Constitution provides in part: 'The Judicial
Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made
under their authority...." U.S. CoNsT. art. III § 2, cl.1.
91 See Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677.
92 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 481 (1983).
93 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
94 Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
95 See HENxrN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TnE CONSTITUTION 222 (1972); HENKIN,
supra note 32, at 140-162.
98 RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 404.
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C. The Provisions of the TVPA and a Comparison to the
ATCA
While the ATCA is essentially ajurisdictional statute,97 the
TVPA provides both jurisdiction to the district court at 28
U.S.C. section 1367 and a private right of action to victims of
torture and extrajudicial killi g under its substantive provi-
sions.9 8 Section 2(a) of the TVPA states:
... an individual who, under actual or apparent authority or color
of law, of any foreign nation (1) subjects an individual to torture
shall, in a civil action be liable for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil
action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal representa-
tive, or to any person who may be a claimant in an action for
wrongful death.99
Unlike the ATCA, which does not specify a class of defend-
ants,100 the TVPA noticeably limits the class to foreign "individ-
ual[s] [acting] under actual or apparent authority or color of
law... ."101 By immunizing foreign nations from suit, the risk
that the United States will offend the sovereignty of other coun-
tries is minimized.
The phrase "actual, or apparent authority," as it appears in
section 2(a), seems to suggest that the actor have some type of
agency relationship with the state. 0 2 The TVPA is not meant
to override the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976103
which renders foreign governments and their agencies largely
immune from human rights suits in America. Thus, TVPA de-
fendants may argue that as 'agents' of the foreign nation they
are barred from liability via the FSIA.
An FSIA defense in this context is unlikely to prevail. For
an individual to gain immunity under the FSIA through the es-
tablishment of an agency relationship, the state must 'admit
97 ATCA, supra note 8.
98 TVPA, supra note 11.
99 TVPA, supra note 11.
100 ATCA, supra note 8.
101 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(a).
102 Committee on International Human Rights, The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York: Torture Victim Protection Act 12 n.24 (1987).
103 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat.
2891 (1976) [hereinafter FSIA].
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some knowledge or authorization of relevant acts.' 0 4 As a prac-
tical matter, governments are not in the habit of admitting they
have an official policy of torture. 0 5
Finally, whatever problems the judiciary will encounter
maintaining jurisdiction over defendants who acted with actual
or apparent authority may be resolved via the 'color of law' pro-
vision.105 The phrase is traditionally linked to actions against
agents.' 07 According to leading cases interpreting 'color of law,'
even when an official acts beyond the lawful scope of his author-
ity, he is still liable if his conduct somehow relates to or flows
from the state' 0 8
In addition to foreign governments, U.S. government offi-
cials are also immune from TVPA actions.10 9 The ATCA, on the
other hand, does not specify a particular class of defendants so
that it remains possible for aliens to sue the United States and
its officials under the ATCA."10
The ATCA and TVPA also differ regarding the proper class
of plaintiffs. The ATCA applies to aliens exclusively" while
U.S. citizens victimized by torture in foreign countries may
bring suit under the TVPA.112 Indeed, the extension of a rem-
edy to U.S. citizens has been cited as one of the primary objec-
tives of the TVPA." 3
The TVPA makes a vital contribution to human rights by
directly incorporating into U.S. law the definition of torture
found in customary international law." 4 Section 3(b)(1) defines
torture as:
104 Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 62, at 107.
105 JONATHAN PowER, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: THE HUmAN RIGHTS STORY 8-
20 (1981).
106 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(a).
107 Supra note 102.
108 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-185 (1965); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 235-38 (1974); Kedra v. City of Philadelphia, 454 F. Supp. 652, 663-
66 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
109 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(a).
110 ATCA, supra note 8.
11 ATCA, supra note 8.
11 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(a).
113 Hearing, supra note 13, at 70 statement of Michael H. Posner, Executive
Director, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
114 TVPA, supra note 11, § 3.
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.. any act, directed against an individual in the offender's cus-
tody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering...
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted... for such
purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person infor-
mation or a confession, punishing that individual for an act that
individual or a third person has committed or is suspected of hav-
ing committed, intimidating or coercing that individual or a third
person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind .... 115
This definition is drawn from the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment which was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
1984.116
The TVPA also provides a definition for extrajudicial killing
which comports with the definition found in the Geneva Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field.117 Under section 3(a) of the TVPA extraju-
dicial killing is defined as:
... a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court [which] afford[s] all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not include any such
killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out under
the authority of a foreign nation.118
By providing precise definitions for torture and extrajudi-
cial killing, the TVPA eliminates potential judicial conflict over
which principles of customary international law are applicable
in cases involving these alleged acts. The ATCA, on the other
hand, lacks precise terms.119
Finally, the TVPA incorporates the requirement of an ex-
haustion of local remedies under section 2(b), which is not pres-
ent under the provisions of the ATCA.' 20 The rule allows courts
115 TVPA, supra note 11, § 3(bXl).
116 CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING
TREATMENT OR PUNSHMENT, art. 1(1), GA Res. 46, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/46 (1984) [hereinafter TORTURE CONVENTION].
117 GENEVA CoNvENToN FOR THE AMuLIORATIoN OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN
ARMED FoRcEs IN THE FlEW, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3114,75 U.N.T.S. 31.
118 TVPA, supra note 11, § 3(a).
119 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812-20.
120 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(b).
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to decline jurisdiction only if the defendant demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence that adequate and available rem-
edies could be assured where the act occurred and that the
plaintiff has not exhausted these remedies. 121 The exhaustion
of local remedies rule also minimi es the possibility that our
district courts will offend state sovereignty. 122
Although the TVPA and ATCA are different in many as-
pects, they incorporate several of the same legal defenses. For
example, diplomatic immunity and the act of state doctrine are
available under both statutes.123 However, the structure of the
TVPA is such that it is less likely to come into conflict with
these defenses. 124 For instance, while the TVPA, by its terms,
does not confront the act of state doctrine directly, it is of little
practical significance. "Congress has directed federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction .... When Congress directs US courts to
exercise jurisdiction over specific types of cases it is in effect
directing the courts not to abstain on the ground of act of
state." 2 5 According to the Restatement:
A claim arising out of an alleged violation of... human rights-for
instance, a claim on behalf of a victim of torture or genocide-
would (if otherwise sustainable) probably not be defeated by the
act of state defense since the accepted international law of human
rights is both well established and contemplates external scrutiny
of such acts .... 126
Although the TVPA has answered many of the questions
raised by ATCA cases, particularly Tel-Oren,'127 it has left other
questions unresolved. In order to ascertain the TVPA's actual
impact, a discussion of its doctrinal and practical limitations is
necessary.
121 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(b).
122 See, e.g., ToRTURE CoNvENTION, supra note 116, at art. 22(5)(b).
123 TVPA, supra note 11; ATCA, supra note 8.
14 TVPA, supra note 11.
125 Hearing, supra note 13, at 59-60 (prepared statement of the Association of
the N.Y.C. Bar).
126 RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE.
VISED) § 469 cmT. c. (Tent. Final Draft 1986)
127 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812-20.
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IV. THE TVPA: How EFFEcTIvE CAN IT BE?
A. The TVPA's Doctrinal Limitations and the Necessity to
Preserve Section 1350
The fact that the TVPA was designed to codify the Filartiga
holding and to respond to the concerns raised by Judge Bork in
Tel-Oren has cleared up much of the confusion surrounding the
proper construction of the ATCA-128 By explicitly providing a
cause of action for torture and extrajudicial killing, the TVPA
goes much further than the ATCA in providing a remedy for
these specific violations.1 29 However, by explicitly providing a
cause of action for these two precise torts Congress may have,
by negative inference, excluded other human rights violations
from judicial review.' 30 It is possible for the TVPA to be inter-
preted, particularly by those justices who are inclined to exer-
cise restraint in international affairs,' 3 ' that only when
Congress has granted specific causes of action is federal juris-
diction over such claims proper.
Assuming the TVPA is interpreted as such, what will hap-
pen to those human rights claims which involve neither torture
nor extrajudicial killing? As Alice Henkin has noted, a forced
disappearance, although not presently a universally condemned
abuse, may very well become a violation of customary interna-
tional law at some point in the future. 32 If and when this oc-
curs, a claim for a forced disappearance will not be cognizable
under the TVPA unless it is considered an act of torture within
2s Hearing, supra note 13.
129 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(a).
130 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(a).
131 See generally, Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799-801; Montana-Dakota, 341 U.S.
246. Judge Bork has not been alone in his wariness to extend the jurisdiction of a
U.S. court into matters of international concern. In Chicago and Southern Air-
lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) the Supreme
Court stated:
ITihe very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not
judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the polit-
ical departments of the government.... They are and should be undertaken
only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance
or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither
aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong
in the domain or political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
132 Hearing, supra note 13, at 71.
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the meaning of section 3(b).'13 It is this very situation that ne-
cessitates preservation of the ATCA. 13
Critics of the TVPA have asserted that it does not preserve
but rather renders the ATCA obsolete because no one would
risk bringing an ATCA claim when the more precise TVPA is
available.135 Moreover, these critics assert that Congress, by
codifying Filartiga through TVPA enactment, has circumvented
the question of whether human rights abuses, other than these
specific acts are enforceable in U.S. courts. 13 6 Therefore, these
additional claims will neither be covered by the TVPA because
they are not claims for torture or extrajudicial killing nor cogni-
zable under the ATCA since they are beyond the scope of the
Filartiga holding.13 7
Fortunately, this logic is fatally flawed. By giving Filartiga
a congressional stamp of approval, 38 Congress does more than
adhere to the principle that freedom from torture is a univer-
sally recognized right. Indeed, the most important principle of
Filartiga is that the law of nations is never static, it is con-
stantly evolving so as to incorporate all violations of customary
international law even in the absence of a specific grant of a
cause of action.'3 9 Moreover, the TVPA is meant to address the
unsatisfactory result in Tel-Oren, a case which did not involve
torture but rather, an act of terrorism. 40
Support for this propostion is found in the recent Ninth Cir-
cuit case of Trajano v. Marcos.141 In Trajano, plaintiff, a citizen
of the Philippines living in Hawaii brought suit in the Hawaii
Federal District Court against exiled Phillipine President Fer-
dinand Marcos and his daughter Imee Marcos-Manotoe for the
torture and wrongful death of plaintiffs son, Archimedes. 142
133 TVPA, supra note 11, § 3(b).
134 Hearing, supra note 13, at 71.
135 See Kathryn L. Pryor, Does the Torture Victim Protection Act Signal the
Imminent Demise of the Alien Tort Claims Act? 29 VA. J. INL L. 969 (1989).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Hearing, supra note 13.
139 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
140 Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 812.
141 In Re: Estate of Ferdiand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation Agapita
Trajano; Archimedes Trajano v. Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imee Marcos-Manotoc,
No. 91-15891, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 26517, (9th Cir. Oct. 19, 1992).
142 Id at 1.
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Marcos' former government tortured and murdered Archimedes
Trajano in the Philippines on August 31, 1977 in retaliation for
Trajano's political beliefs and activities. 143
Marcos-Manotoe did not apear and a default judgment was
entered against her.144 On appeal, she contended that the Dis-
trict Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the ATCA
to adjudicate a claim of torture committed by a foreign state
against its own nationals where no nexus to the United States
had been established.145
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's exercise of
jurisdiction and held:
.. all states believe [torture] is wrong, all that engage in torture
deny it, and no state claims a sovereign right to torture its own
citizens. Under international law, any state that engages in offi-
cial torture violates jus cogens.... We therefore conclude that the
district court did not err in finding jurisdiction on a violation of
the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture. 46
Thus, Congress has spoken to ensure that the Filartiga ap-
proach to adjudicating human rights claims under the ATCA is
the correct approach, while the Tel-Oren decision is based on
outdated and unworkable perceptions of international law.' 47
As a result, the TVPA goes beyond preservation of the ATCA, it
revitalizes the ATCA so that both statutes may be used to ad-
dress a wide variety of abuses.148
Jurisdiction under the ATCA, as opposed to the TVPA,
would be proper not only where claims other than torture and
extrajudicial killing are at issue but where a foreign govern-
ment is made a defendant. 49 It is ironic that although Tel-Oren
provided the impetus for the TVPA's enactment,' 50 the case
would also be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction if brought, in-
stead, under the TVPA. Libya, as a foreign nation, is not a
proper TVPA defendant. 15 ' However, the TVPA, by definition
14 Id. at 3.
14 Id. at 2, 4.
145 Id. at 2.
146 Id. at 20.
147 TVPA, supra note 11.
148 TVPA, supra note 11; ATCA, supra note 8.
149 TVPA, supra note 11; ATCA, supra note 8.
150 See Tel.Oren, 726 F.2d 774; TVPA, supra note 11.
151 TVPA, supra note 11, § 2(a).
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is a condemnation of the Tel-Oren result.152 If a case similar to
Tel-Oren were brought under the ATCA today, it would most
likely be decided very differently.
Cases in which the plaintiffs did not seek adequate domes-
tic remedies before bringing suit in U.S. district court would
also be proper ATCA cases since the ATCA does not require an
exhaustion of local remedies. 153 This is extremely beneficial to
those plaintiffs for whom seeking a local remedy is either too
expensive, too time-consuming or simply too dangerous.
International consensus on what is considered an act of tor-
ture will clearly change over time, recognizing more violations
than it does presently.154 Given the congressional intent of the
TVPA-55 and the desire on the part of the United States to rec-
ognize its human rights responsibilities, 56 it is likely that the
judiciary's interpretation of the TVPA will over time reflect this
changing consensus. Finally, whatever problems do occur may
be alleviated by congressionally amending either the TVPA, the
ATCA or both.
Practical limitations, unlike doctrinal weaknesses, is a dif-
ferent animal. They cannot be resolved by amending a statute
or reversing a decision. Practical difficulties in law enforcement
are never felt more strongly than in the international human
rights arena.157 Indeed, it is with an eye toward these limita-
tions that the real impact of the TVPA can be properly
ascertained.
B. Practical Limitations of the TVPA: What Is Its Actual
Impact?
In order for the district court to obtain personal jurisdiction
over a defendant under the TVPA, either the plaintiff and the
defendant must be in the court's territorial jurisdiction simulta-
152 See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d 774; TVPA, supra note 11.
153 TVPA, supra note 11; ATCA, supra note 8.
154 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878.
155 Hearing, supra note 13.
156 TVPA, supra note 11, Statement of Purpose: "[tio carry out obligations of
the United States under the United Nations Charter and other international
agreements pertaining to the protection of human rights by establishing a civil
action for recovery of damages from an individual who engages in torture or extra-
judicial killing."
167 PowER, supra note 105, at 8-10.
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neously' 58 or the defendant must have minimum contacts with
the forum.159 This would require that the defendant have some
contact with a particular state in the U.S. through current
travel or residency. The TVPA precludes suing just any foreign
official that has no contact with the United States. 160 More-
over, there is no provision in the TVPA that requires courts to
disregard the principle of forum non conveniens, which could
lead them to defer cases to the jurisdiction of another nation if it
is more convenient for both the parties and the witnesses.' 6 '
Does the minimum contacts doctrine undermine the overall
purpose of the TVPA? Even if the plaintiff and defendant are in
the same forum at the same time, what is the likelihood that
they will find each other? The answer to this problem is solved,
in part, by looking to organizations such as Amnesty Interna-
tional, which tracks human rights abusers regularly so that a
torturer's visit to the United States does not go unnoticed. 1 62
However, if the torturer is found and the case goes to trial
with a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, what is the
likelihood that the judgment can or will be enforced? Although
the plaintiffs in Filartiga were awarded five million dollars
each, 163 not a single penny was collected. These damage
awards were never enforced by the defendant's domestic court
in Paraguay.164
The problem of enforcing judgments abroad is clearly be-
yond the scope of this comment. Nevertheless, it is a legitimate
question because it directly implicates how effective the TVPA
can be. If a torturer cannot be forced to pay for his actions, the
TVPA will serve no preventive function at all. However, the
TVPA by itself cannot realistically be expected to prevent the
global epidemic of torture. Indeed, its greatest attribute lies not
158 TVPA, supra note 11.
159 See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
160 TVPA, supra note 11.
161 TVPA, supra note 11; For a discussion of both the practical and policy con-
siderations that federal courts must weigh when adjudicating a claim of forum non
conveniens in a suit involving non-resident aliens, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235 (1981).
162 PowER, supra note 105, at 8-20.
163 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
164 ENiN, supra note 32, at 135 n.5.
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in its capacity as a preventive mechanism, but in its ability to
serve as a model for future legislation.
V. CONCLUSION
The Torture Victim Protection Act,165 like any instrument
for international human rights enforcement, will go only as far
as the 'real world' allows it to. Although this legislation is by no
means the end all be all of human rights enforcement, it cannot
be dismissed as just a nice gesture on the part of Congress. In
the view of the Lawyer's Committee, the TVPA:
.. add[s] a new dimension to U.S. human rights policy by serving
notice to individuals engaged in human rights violations that the
United States strongly condemns such acts and will not shelter
human rights violators from being accountable in appropriate
proceedings. The legislation... encourages other nations to de-
velop and apply meaningful domestic remedies, clearly the most
effective deterrent to continued human rights abuses.... This
country can and should become a model for other nations by ex-
tending practical remedies to victims of human rights abuses. 166
Perhaps the most important contribution of the TVPA is
not what it can accomplish by itself, but rather what it has laid
the ground work for (i.e., future legislation for the prevention of
torture and other abuses on the part of other countries in the
international community). This is certainly no small feat. By
giving human rights victims the power to seek vindication of
their rights themselves, the Torture Victim Protection Act dem-
onstrates a serious commitment to human rights around the
world and to the dream that all human beings may one day live
free from torture.
Jennifer Correale
165 TVPA, supra note 11.
166 Matthew H. Murray, The Torture Victim Protection Act: Legislation to Pro-
mote Enforcement of the Human Rights of Aliens in U.S. Courts, 25 COLUM. J.
TRANSNATL L. 673 (citing The Lawyers' Committee for International Human
Rights, Briefing Book: The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1986, at 3 (1986)).
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